Abstract. SFLASH is a signature scheme which belongs to a family of multivariate schemes proposed by Patarin et al. in 1998 [9]. The SFLASH scheme itself has been designed in 2001 [8] and has been selected in 2003 by the NESSIE European Consortium [6] as the best known solution for implementation on low cost smart cards. In this paper, we show that slight modifications of the parameters of SFLASH within the general family initially proposed renders the scheme insecure. The attack uses simple linear algebra, and allows to forge a signature for an arbitrary message in a question of minutes for practical parameters, using only the public key. Although SFLASH itself is not amenable to our attack, it is worrying to observe that no rationale was ever offered for this "lucky" choice of parameters.
Introduction
Multivariate Cryptography is an area of research which attempts to build asymmetric primitives, based on hard computational problems related to multivariate quadratic polynomials over a finite field. Multivariate schemes have recently received much attention, for several reasons. First, the hard problems of reference are not known to be polynomial in the quantum model, unlike integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problems. More importantly, Multivariate Cryptography offers a large collection of primitives and problems of a new flavor. In general, multivariate schemes require modest computational resources and can be implemented on low cost smart cards. Moreover, these schemes benefit from several nice properties such as providing very short or very fast signatures. Also, they are quite versatile: a number of generic non-exclusive variations can be derived from a few basic schemes. Even when the original schemes are weak, variations are often considered to avoid structural attacks.
One of the more elaborate outcomes of Multivariate Cryptography is probably the SFLASH signature scheme. Designed by Patarin et al. [8] , it is among the fastest signatures schemes known, with NTRUSign and TTS [4, 11] . Although initial tweaks in the first version of SFLASH were shown inappropriate [3] , the second version of SFLASH is currently considered secure, as testified from the recent acceptance of this primitive by the NESSIE European Consortium [6] .
The structure of SFLASH is among the simplest in Multivariate Cryptography. Roughly speaking, SFLASH is a truncated C * scheme. The C * scheme was invented by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988 [5] , and was shown to be insecure by Patarin in 1995 [7] . Later, Patarin et al. considered the simple variation of C * consisting in deleting from the public key a large number of coordinates [9] . Schemes derived from C * by this principle are called C * − schemes; they are well suited for signature. As soon as the number of deleted coordinates is large enough, C * − schemes are considered secure. SFLASH belongs to the C * − family and has been chosen as a candidate for the NESSIE selection, and finally accepted.
Our Results. We argue that the security of the C * − schemes remains insufficiently understood. In particular, one may rightfully question the reasons for the particular choice of parameters opted for in SFLASH. Might other parameters yield the same security ?
In this paper, we show that many choices of parameters for C * − schemes are insecure. Our approach uses basic properties of the differential as introduced in [2] . Since the differential is bilinear and symmetric, it seems natural to consider skew-symmetric linear maps with respect to this function. This property is so specific and overdefined that the space of skew-symmetric maps is left unchanged when we replace the full public key of C * by its truncated version C * − , even when the number of deleted coordinates is very large. Skew-symmetric maps can be recovered from their defining equation in terms of the differential of a C * − public key, using only linear algebra. Once this has been achieved, compositions of these maps with the public key can be used to recover a full C * public key, which can then be inverted using the original attack by Patarin [7] .
The schemes under attack are those for which the internal C * parameter and the number of variables are not coprime. Such parameters are perfectly acceptable for practical realizations of C * − schemes in the current state of cryptanalysis. SFLASH with the recommended set of parameters escapes this attack. However, this shows that the elements underlying the security of C * − schemes and their relations with parameters are not well identified. To illustrate this point, we show that changing the parameters of SFLASH by one renders the scheme breakable in a few minutes.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we recall the definition of C * and C * − schemes. Then, in Section 3, we characterize skew-symmetric maps with respect to the differential of C * . In Section 4, we show that the same maps can be recovered from a truncated version C * − of the original C * public key. Finally, in section 5, we show how their use allows us to restore a full C * public key.
The Generic Construction of Multivariate Schemes
We denote by F n q the n-dimensional vector space over the finite field F q with q elements. A function from F n q to F m q is defined by m coordinate-polynomials in n variables. When these polynomials have multivariate degree 2, the function is termed quadratic. Finding a preimage of a quadratic function involves solving a multivariate quadratic system of equations, an NP-hard problem in general. Nevertheless, some classes of easily invertible quadratic functions are known and can form the basis of a multivariate asymmetric scheme. More precisely, the generic construction of multivariate schemes is the following. The key generation algorithm hides an easily invertible quadratic function F by two linear (or affine) changes of coordinates U and T into a function P defined by
P is the public key and U, T are the secret key. The proponents of multivariate cryptography argue that the function P is a random-looking quadratic function, which is expected to be hard to invert by general purpose techniques. An encrypted message can be decrypted by using the secret key (T, U ) to undo the hiding process and by solving the easy internal quadratic system.
The C
* scheme
The C * scheme was proposed by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988 [5] . In the C * scheme, the internal easy-to-invert function is defined from a monomial over the degree n extension field of F q , denoted F q n , of the form
where θ is a positive integer. The function F is isomorphic to a quadratic function from F n q into itself and provided q is even, the integer θ can be chosen so that F is a permutation. This happens if and only if gcd(q θ + 1, q n − 1) = 1. In Appendix A, we show that, denoting by d the gcd of θ and n, this is equivalent to the condition that n d is odd. The C * scheme, as previously described, was shown to be insecure by Patarin [7] . It was observed that, for any x, y such that F (x) = y, we have
It follows that there exist n bilinear relations between a ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext. These bilinear relations can be found from the public key with a few plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Using these bilinear relations allows us to recover the plaintext from any ciphertext, by linear algebra.
Several ways to withstand the attack by Patarin were later considered. Among the most promising, are the C * − schemes. In the next section, we recall these schemes in detail.
C * − schemes
A C * − scheme is derived from a C * scheme by simply deleting from the C * public key some of the quadratic polynomials. More precisely, for some additional parameter r, the key generation builds a C * scheme and then deletes from the public key the last r coordinates. In the sequel, Π will denote the projection on the first (n − r) coordinates, P the C * public key, and P Π the resulting C * − public key. To find a preimage under P Π of a string y of (F q ) n−r , the user first has to pad y with some string k of (F q ) r , and then has to find the preimage of (y, k) by P using its secret key U, T . Using a C * − scheme for encryption is therefore quite awkward: to recover the plaintext, the user has to review all possible paddings k, compute for each k the corresponding preimage, and identify the plaintext among these preimages by using some message redundancy. However, C * − schemes are well-suited for signature, even for large q and r, since in this setting any of the q r preimages of y by P Π is a valid signature of y. To sign the message y, the user chooses an arbitrary k and the signature consists in the preimage of (y, k) by P . In the sequel, we only consider the C * − scheme in the signature setting. C * − schemes were first introduced by Patarin et al. [9] , but the idea of enhancing the security of multivariate schemes by deleting a few coordinates from the public key first appeared in Shamir [10] . In [9] , Patarin et al. describe a technique for reconstructing a C * public key from a C * − public key with complexity of the order of q r . Accordingly, the parameters q and r must be chosen such that q r ≃ 2 80 for practical instantiations of C * − schemes. The illustrative notation C * −− is sometimes used in this case. No condition is specified in the literature for choosing the parameter θ besides the obvious requirement that the corresponding monomial should be invertible and, as seen before, all values of θ whose gcd d with n is such that n d is odd can be chosen. In fact, choosing a large d allows a faster inversion of the C * monomial, as observed by Ding [1] , and can be an attractive choice.
SFLASH. Practical instantiations of C
* − schemes were proposed by Patarin et al. as candidates to the European call for primitives NESSIE in 2001. These instantiations were called FLASH and SFLASH. Initially, some tweak was added to SFLASH to decrease the size of the public key, however this tweak rendered the scheme insecure, as shown by Gilbert and Minier in 2002 [3] , and discarded. Without this tweak, FLASH and SFLASH are very similar and therefore, only SFLASH was later considered by the NESSIE evaluation process, and finally accepted in 2003. The recommended parameters of SFLASH are q = 2 7 , n = 37, θ = 11 and r = 11; signatures are 239 bits long. Until now, no weakness was reported in either SFLASH or the general design principle of C * − schemes. In the sequel, we will show that many C * − schemes are insecure. The C * − schemes under attack are those for which the gcd d of θ and n is not 1. Note that this is different than the condition that n d is odd, which is needed to make the mapping invertible. The attack makes it possible to forge a signature in a matter of minutes for practical parameters. The attack does not apply to SFLASH for which the recommended parameters θ and n are coprime. However this "lucky" choice appears to be accidental since no rationale was offered for it.
3 Skew-Symmetric Maps w.r.t the Differential of C * In this section, we consider some properties of the differential of the internal C * monomial. Implications of these properties to C * − schemes will be addressed in the next section.
The differential, defined as follows, can be considered for any quadratic function F . For any element a, the difference function x → F (x + a) − F (x) is affine and its constant term is F (a) − F (0). Its linear part is called the differential of F at a and is denoted DF (a, x) :
DF (a, x) is actually bilinear and symmetric when considered as a function of a and x. Our attack is based on considering skew-symmetric maps with respect to this bilinear function i.e. linear maps M such that for all choices of x and a
This is a very strong condition, and when F is defined by a random collection of quadratic polynomials, only trivial solutions M are expected to satisfy this condition. However, when
The skew-symmetric maps with respect to the differential of such a C * monomial are given by the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let M be a linear map; M is skew-symmetric with respect to DF (a, x) if and only if M is the multiplication by some element ξ satisfying ξ
When DF is the differential of the C * monomial given by (1), we get for any elements a, x in F q n n−1 i=0
Since the monomials a q u x q v are a basis of the space of bilinear maps over F q n , we obtain the following equations corresponding to the various elements of the basis
Conversely, it is straightforward to see that multiplications by an element ξ satisfying ξ q θ + ξ = 0 are skew-symmetric with respect to DF :
which concludes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
We denote by K θ the set of the elements ξ such that ξ q θ +ξ = 0. By the linearity of q-powerings, this is a linear space. The non-zero elements of K θ are the (q θ −1)-th roots of the unity and the number of these elements is gcd(q θ −1, q n −1) = q d −1 where d is the gcd of θ and n. Consequently, K θ is a linear space of dimension d.
For any element ξ in K θ , we denote by M ξ multiplication by ξ. As stated by the theorem, the maps M ξ are the skew-symmetric applications with respect to the differential of the C * monomial. They form a linear space isomorphic to K θ . When d = 1, K θ is generated by 1, and all the maps M ξ are colinear to the identity. This case is trivial since scalar multiples of the identity are skewsymmetric with respect to any bilinear product. Accordingly, non-trivial maps M ξ only exist when d > 1.
Recovering the Skew-Symmetric Maps from a C * −

Public Key
Let P be a C * public key and let P Π be the C * − public key obtained from P by deleting the last r coordinates. Since P is a composition T • F • U where F is the internal C * monomial and U, T are secret changes of coordinates, P Π is the composition T Π • F • U where T Π is obtained from T by removing the last r rows. The differential of P Π is
Since DF (U (a), U (x)) is isomorphic by U to DF (a, x), the skew-symmetric maps with respect to DF (U (a), U (x)) are the maps denoted N ξ defined by
By the linearity of T Π , all the maps N ξ are also skew-symmetric with respect to the truncated DP Π :
We argue that they are likely to be the only ones, even when the number r of deleted coordinates is very close to n. For any pair (a, x), the equation
gives us n − r linear equations in the n 2 coefficients of the unknown L. Since Equation (2) is bilinear and symmetric in (a, x) and trivial when a = x, taking n 2 linearly independent choices for a and x, we construct a system of (n−r)n(n− 1)/2 linear equations in the n 2 coefficients of L. The kernel of these equations must contain the d-dimensional space formed by the maps N ξ . Assuming that all the generated linear equations are otherwise independent, the kernel does not contain other solutions up to r satisfying
According to this heuristic, the maps N ξ are likely to be the only solutions of our greatly overdefined system of linear equations provided that r ≤ r max where
which is very close to n. Consequently, we expect to find the same linear subspace of solutions even if we delete from the C * public key almost all the quadratic polynomials, in order to generate the C * − public key. Though this analysis is rather naive, it provides a good estimate of the actual value of r max as observed from some computer experiments. In the table below, we report on the actual value of r max found for several parameters, to be compared with the heuristic value n − 3. The parameters chosen for these experiments are very close to the recommended parameters n = 37 and θ = 11 for SFLASH, with the same value of q = 2 7 . Note that in practice r would be chosen to be much smaller than nabout n 3 in SFLASH -and thus our approach could be easily applied even if not all the equations happen to be sufficiently independent.
Using Equation (2) with n 2 independent choices for a and x, we find all maps N ξ by linear algebra. This takes a few seconds for practical parameters.
5 Recomposing a C * Public Key using Skew-Symmetric Maps
At this point, we assume that the linear space of skew-symmetric maps N ξ has been computed. Non-trivial N ξ are those which are not colinear to the identity.
For any non-trivial N ξ , we can now generate two C * − public keys P Π and P Π •N ξ . We next show that, provided r is at most n 2 , completing P Π with r arbitrary polynomials from P Π • N ξ creates a valid C * public key with high probability. Though higher values of r are not of practical interest, the technique can be generalized to r ≤ n(1 − Let us recall that the function P Π is a composition T Π • F • U , where U is a secret isomorphism, F is the C * monomial and T Π consists of n− r linearly independent rows. Besides, N ξ equals U −1 • M ξ • U , where M ξ denotes multiplication by ξ. The composition of P Π and N ξ is
Since F is multiplicative, multiplying the input by ξ results in multiplying the output by F (ξ). Therefore
where M F (ξ) denotes the multiplication by F (ξ). Since N ξ is non-trivial, ξ is not colinear to 1, and since the inverse of F is a power function, F (ξ) is not colinear to 1 either. Hence, M F (ξ) is non-trivial and the matrices T Π and
The n−r quadratic polynomials defining P Π are linear combinations encoded by the rows of T Π of the n quadratic polynomials defining F • U , whereas the n − r quadratic polynomials defining P Π • N ξ are different linear combinations encoded by the rows of T Π • M F (ξ) of the same n quadratic polynomials defining F • U . Adding r polynomials of P Π • N ξ to P Π recomposes a valid C * public key if and only if the corresponding rows of T Π • M F (ξ) added to the rows of T Π form a full rank system. Let us select, for instance, the r first rows of T Π • M F (ξ) . The rows of T Π generate a subspace of dimension n−r of (F q ) n . A random vector lies in a subspace of dimension n − k of (F q ) n with probability q −k . Therefore, if we assume that the selected rows of T Π • M F (ξ) are random vectors, the probability that they form with the rows of T Π a full rank system is
With this probability, adding the r first polynomials of P Π • N ξ to P Π will recover a valid C * public key (which is not necessarily identical to the C * key we started with). This public key corresponds to a secret key T obtained by adding to T Π the first r rows of T Π • M F (ξ) . We then apply Patarin's attack and recover n message-signature bilinear relations. If adding the r first polynomials fails to recover a C * public key (which can be detected by the failure of Patarin's attack), we can retry with a different set of r polynomials of P Π • N ξ , or try a different value of ξ. The probability of success in t independent trials is expected to be q −(t−1) . The table below provides some timings (in seconds) for an actual implementation of our attack on a single PC. We successfully recovered a C * public key from a Cmajor discovery since it was currently believed that even a weak scheme such as C * can be made secure by simply deleting a sufficiently large number of coordinates from the public key. We have shown that this design fails for some choices of parameters. This shows that the security of C * − schemes relies on mechanisms which are more subtle than anticipated, and does not necessarily improve when we increase the parameters. In particular, it is quite worrying to observe that no rationale was ever offered for the parameters recommended for SFLASH. It should be added that further unpublished work performed by the authors together with Adi Shamir has shown that the weakness of C * − schemes was not only a matter of parameter choice, since they were able to mount a practical attack against the actual SFLASH schemes. 
